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Implications of game theory for theoretical underpinning of cooperative relations in workplace partnership Journal

By: Trif, Aurora | Brady, MalcolmMaterial type: TextTextPublication details: Industrial Relations Journal 2013Description: Journal articleISSN: 1467-8543Subject(s): Trade unions | Employment relations | Industrial relations | ManagementDDC classification: Journals Online access: Open e-book (Ruskin students only) Summary: This article clarifies the ongoing debate over the key factors underpinning cooperative relations between management and trade unions by drawing on the once-off and repeated prisoner's dilemma models. It argues that the lower the risk to achieve a ‘win-win’ outcome and the longer the time horizon for workplace partnership, the more likely is for the two parties to cooperate.
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<p>Industrial Relations Journal, Vol.&nbsp;44 no. 3 (May 2013), p. 258-275</p> <p>Available in the library. See journal shelves.</p> <p>Available online.&nbsp;</p>

This article clarifies the ongoing debate over the key factors underpinning cooperative relations between management and trade unions by drawing on the once-off and repeated prisoner's dilemma models. It argues that the lower the risk to achieve a ‘win-win’ outcome and the longer the time horizon for workplace partnership, the more likely is for the two parties to cooperate.

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