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008 130524s2013####xx#||||||||||||||#||####|
022 _a1467-8543
082 _aJournals
100 _aTrif, Aurora
100 _aBrady, Malcolm
245 1 0 _aImplications of game theory for theoretical underpinning of cooperative relations in workplace partnership
_hJournal
260 _a
_bIndustrial Relations Journal
_c2013
300 _aJournal article
500 _a<p>Industrial Relations Journal, Vol.&nbsp;44 no. 3 (May 2013), p. 258-275</p> <p>Available in the library. See journal shelves.</p> <p>Available online.&nbsp;</p>
520 _aThis article clarifies the ongoing debate over the key factors underpinning cooperative relations between management and trade unions by drawing on the once-off and repeated prisoner's dilemma models. It argues that the lower the risk to achieve a ‘win-win’ outcome and the longer the time horizon for workplace partnership, the more likely is for the two parties to cooperate.
650 _aTrade unions
650 _aEmployment relations
650 _aIndustrial relations
650 _aManagement
856 _uhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1111/irj.12016
_yOpen e-book (Ruskin students only)
999 _c131623
_d131623