Trif, Aurora Brady, Malcolm <br/><br/>
Implications of game theory for theoretical underpinning of cooperative relations in workplace partnership  Journal 

 -  Industrial Relations Journal  2013 
 - Journal article 
<br/><br/> <p>Industrial Relations Journal, Vol.&nbsp;44 no. 3 (May 2013), p. 258-275</p>  <p>Available in the library. See journal shelves.</p>  <p>Available online.&nbsp;</p> 
<br/><br/> This article clarifies the ongoing debate over the key factors underpinning cooperative relations between management and trade unions by drawing on the once-off and repeated prisoner's dilemma models. It argues that the lower the risk to achieve a ‘win-win’ outcome and the longer the time horizon for workplace partnership, the more likely is for the two parties to cooperate. 
<br/><br/><label>ISSN: </label>1467-8543 
<br/><br/><label>Subjects--Topical Terms: </label><br/>Trade unions<br/>Employment relations<br/>Industrial relations<br/>Management
<br/><br/><label>Dewey Class. No.: </label>Journals