Free will and epistemology : a defence of the transcendental argument for freedom / Robert Lockie.
Material type:
TextPublisher: London : Bloomsbury Academic, 2019Description: 320 pagesContent type: text Media type: computer Carrier type: online resourceISBN: 9781350029057 (ebook)Subject(s): Free will and determinism | Knowledge, Theory of | Philosophy | Philosophy: epistemology & theory of knowledge | Topics in philosophyGenre/Form: Online access: Click here to access online Also available in printed form ISBN 9781350123137Summary: In the first in-depth study of the transcendental argument for decades, Free Will and Epistemology defends a modern version of the famous transcendental argument for free will: that we could not be justified in undermining a strong notion of free will, as a strong notion of free will is required for any such process of undermining to be itself epistemically justified. By arguing for a conception of internalism that goes back to the early days of the internalist-externalist debates, it draws on work by Richard Foley, William Alston and Alvin Plantinga to explain the importance of epistemic deontology and its role in the transcendental argument. It expands on the principle that `ought' implies `can' and presents a strong case for a form of self-determination. With references to cases in the neuroscientific and cognitive-psychological literature, Free Will and Epistemology provides an original contribution to work on epistemic justification and the free will debate.
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Originally published: 2018.
In the first in-depth study of the transcendental argument for decades, Free Will and Epistemology defends a modern version of the famous transcendental argument for free will: that we could not be justified in undermining a strong notion of free will, as a strong notion of free will is required for any such process of undermining to be itself epistemically justified. By arguing for a conception of internalism that goes back to the early days of the internalist-externalist debates, it draws on work by Richard Foley, William Alston and Alvin Plantinga to explain the importance of epistemic deontology and its role in the transcendental argument. It expands on the principle that `ought' implies `can' and presents a strong case for a form of self-determination. With references to cases in the neuroscientific and cognitive-psychological literature, Free Will and Epistemology provides an original contribution to work on epistemic justification and the free will debate.
Also available in printed form ISBN 9781350123137
Electronic reproduction. Askews and Holts. Mode of access: World Wide Web.
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