Fair revenue sharing mechanisms for strategic passenger airline alliances / Demet Cetiner.
Material type:
TextSeries: Lecture notes in economics and mathematical systems ; 668.Publisher: Heidelberg : Springer, [2013]Description: xv, 168 pages : illustrations (black and white)Content type: text Media type: computer Carrier type: online resourceISBN: 9783642358227 (ebook)Subject(s): Revenue management | Airlines -- Management | Airlines -- Accounting | Business and Management | Management of specific areas | Operational research | Game theory | Production & quality control managementGenre/Form: LOC classification: HD60.7 | .C48 2013Online access: Click here to access online Also available in printed form ISBN 9783642358210Summary: This book examines fair revenue proportions for airline alliances. It looks at the fairness of the revenue sharing mechanisms, where the alliance partners behave selfishly, and develops a new selfish revenue allocation rule. ?A major problem arising in airline alliances is to design allocation mechanisms determining how the revenue of a product should be shared among the airlines. The nucleolus is a concept of cooperative game theory that provides solutions for allocating the cost or benefit of a cooperation. This work provides fair revenue proportions for the airline alliances based on the nucleolus, which assumes a centralized decision making system. The proposed mechanism is used as a benchmark to evaluate the fairness of the revenue sharing mechanisms, where the alliance partners behave selfishly. Additionally, a new selfish revenue allocation rule is developed that improves the performance of the existing methods.
| Item type | Current library | Home library | Class number | Status | Date due | Barcode | Item reservations | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
E-book
|
Electronic publication | Electronic publication | Available |
Dissertation--University of Duisburg-Essen, 2012.
Includes bibliographical references.
This book examines fair revenue proportions for airline alliances. It looks at the fairness of the revenue sharing mechanisms, where the alliance partners behave selfishly, and develops a new selfish revenue allocation rule. ?A major problem arising in airline alliances is to design allocation mechanisms determining how the revenue of a product should be shared among the airlines. The nucleolus is a concept of cooperative game theory that provides solutions for allocating the cost or benefit of a cooperation. This work provides fair revenue proportions for the airline alliances based on the nucleolus, which assumes a centralized decision making system. The proposed mechanism is used as a benchmark to evaluate the fairness of the revenue sharing mechanisms, where the alliance partners behave selfishly. Additionally, a new selfish revenue allocation rule is developed that improves the performance of the existing methods.
Also available in printed form ISBN 9783642358210
Electronic reproduction. Askews and Holts. Mode of access: World Wide Web.
There are no comments on this title.